This paper investigates the amplication mechanism of the nancial accelerator on the equity premium in a production economy. To accomplish this, I incorporate the Gertler and Karadi (2011) type nancial accelerator into a medium-scale New Keynesian model with generalized recursive preferences. I nd that the nancial accelerator is a very plausible and new amplication mechanism for risk premia in the model. For the baseline calibration, the nancial accelerator increases the equity premium by 46 basis points and produces fourfold greater response to shocks than the modelimplied equity premium without nancial frictions. I also show two channels by which the nancial accelerator aects the equity premium. The rst channel increases the variability of the stochastic discount factor, and the second channel aects interest rates and ination through the Taylor rule and marginal cost, respectively. Finally, increasing the adjustment costs of investment does not improve the asset pricing performance in the model. JEL classication: E32, E44, G12
Introduction
Macroeconomic models with the nancial accelerator have received substantial attention after the Great Recession. The nancial accelerator introduces a friction between lenders and borrowers that amplies business cycle uctuations in macroeconomic models (e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999;  Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; and Gertler and Karadi, 2011). With a negative shock, the amplication mechanism is driven by the disruption of asset value that reduces lending (or borrowing) capacity for nancial intermediaries (or non-nancial rms). These macroeconomic models, however, do not seek to account for asset prices and risk premia, and are not particularly good at matching nancial market variables.
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In the present paper, I investigate the amplication eect of the nancial accelerator on the equity premium in a general equilibrium framework. This attempt has important implications for the macronance literature. Traditionally, there are two dierent approaches in the asset pricing literature to capturing suciently large risk premia: one is increasing risk in the model by introducing uncertainty in the model (e.g., Weiztman, 2007; and Barillas, Hansen and Sargent, 2009), long-run risk (e.g., Bansal and Yaron, 2004; and Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012) , or rare disaster (e.g., Rietz, 1988; and Gourio, 2012 ) and the other is using heterogeneous agents (e.g., Constantinides and Due, 1996;  and Schmidt, 2015) . I therefore make an attempt to expand the understanding of the interaction between the macroeconomy and nancial markets by analyzing the role of nancial frictions on the risk premium.
To accomplish this, I incorporate the Gertler and Karadi (2011) type nancial accelerator and generalized recursive preferences into a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model. In addition to the nancial accelerator, generalized recursive preferences also have a salient role because they allow model not only to match the basic macroeconomic behaviors but also to generate substantial risk premia. Thus, in this paper, generalized recursive preferences are exploited rather than expected utility preferences or habit preferences. My results are as follows. First, the nancial accelerator amplies both the size and the response of the equity premium. For the baseline calibration, the nancial accelerator increases the equity premium by 46 basis points and produces fourfold greater response to shocks than the model-implied equity premium without nancial frictions. Second, the impact of the nancial accelerator on the equity premium has two dierent channels. The rst channel increases the variability of the stochastic discount factor, and the second channel aects interest rates and ination through the Taylor rule and marginal cost, respectively. Finally, increasing the adjustment costs of investment does not improve the asset pricing performance in the model.
The intuition for the amplication mechanism of the nancial accelerator is simple. During recessions, the marginal productivity of capital decreases and this leads to a lower return of capital. The net worth of nancial intermediaries then declines because the return of capital is the only source of prots for the bank in the model. Because net worth is reduced, nancial intermediaries are less likely to issue security, which reduces capital. As capital demand declines, so does the price of capital, which again reduces capital returns and lowers the bank's net worth. Through this cycle, even small shock can have an amplied impact on the economy, and the volatility of consumption and the stochastic discount factor increases.
The nancial accelerator also reduces the output more and increases ination less when there is a negative technology shock. As the nancial accelerator causes the price of capital to fall further and osets the rise in marginal cost, the ination rises slightly. The central bank thus is tempted to respond more to the economic downturn rather than ination although it depends on the central bank's stance to monetary policy. If this is true, the risk-free return may fall and the equity premium increases more with the nancial friction.
Finally, the equity premium is not sensitive to the investment adjustment cost.
3 There are two main reasons for this. The rst is that capital producers own all the capital stock in this model. As in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) , my model introduces capital producers to easily determine the capital price endogenously. Therefore, the inelastic supply of capital has little eect on the consumption of households and the equity premium. Second, households do not have habit preferences. The habit preferences in a production economy focus on achieving consumption smoothing at any cost. In contrast, households without habit preferences do not cost more for consumption smoothing, even as the investment adjustment costs increase. This paper is closely related with two strands of literature. First, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) construct quantitative DSGE models with nancial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints so that they amplify shocks to the macroeconomy. In contrast to these papers, the model here matches not only features of the real economy but also the equity premium. Second, Tallarini (2000) , Campanale, Castro, and Clementi (2010), and Swanson (2016) document that generalized recursive preferences allow models to generate substantial risk premium without distortion of their ability to match the macroeconomic facts. Relative to them, the model here considers nancial market disruptions and a sharp contraction of the real economy due to the nancial accelerator, and its eect on the equity premium.
The present paper is also linked to the three papers that study the implication of nancial frictions on asset pricing uctuations. Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003, henceforth GYZ) nd that the mean of the equity premium is signicantly higher with nancial market imperfections. There are several important dierences between my paper and GYZ. First, in my model, generalized recursive preferences have a dominant eect on the equity premium compared to that of the nancial frictions. Instead, their study uses standard expected utility preferences that replicate a very small equity premium. Second, I employ conventional asset pricing theory as in Cochrane (2009) and solve the model nonlinearly to reect the risk of the model. On the other hand, their work denes the equity premium as the spread between the return of capital and the risk-free rate, which they solve using a standard rst order solution. Thus, their equity premium is a risk-neutral external nance cost rather than a risk premium. Finally, the nancial frictions in their model are more traditional: their friction is between the entrepreneurs and banks, and an entrepreneur's ability to raise funds relies on its capital. In contrast, in my model, the agency problem is between nancial intermediaries and households to reect some features of the recent nancial crisis. 4 5 In terms of the model, perhaps Bigio (2012) is the closest to the present paper. Bigio (2012) Bigio (2012) uses the stochastic discount factor of the saving-type entrepreneur who increases consumption to the liquidity shocks. By contrast, my paper exploits the household's stochastic discount factor which is countercyclical. Moreover, due to the lack of explicit nancial system in that paper, the liquidity shocks have so small eects on both asset pricing and the macroeconomy. The other related paper is He and Krishnamurthy (2013) . In that paper, nancial intermediaries are considered as marginal investors in asset pricing, and a more sophisticated structure could be established to calibrate risk-premia. However, their model is relatively weak in explaining the linkage with the macroeconomy, as an overlapping generation model is used in an endowment economy.
As the goal of this paper is illustrating the underlying mechanisms how the nancial accelerator aects the risk premium, I want to keep the simplicity of the model by considering technology shock only. This is not an unreasonable assumption. According to Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) , the response of the term premium to the technology shock shows greater response by a factor of 250 and 625 than monetary policy shock and government spending shock, respectively. Thus, Tallarini (2000) , GYZ, and Swanson (2016) did not consider any exogenous shock other than the technology shock.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model with the nancial accelerator and generalized recursive preferences. Section 3 lays out the calibration results. Sections 4 concludes. An appendix to the paper provides additional details of how the model is solved.
The Model
In this section, I begin by outlining a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model and use it to price equity. The model has two important ingredients: the nancial accelerator (as in Gertler and Karadi, 2011 ) and generalized recursive preferences (as in Tallarini, 2000; and Swanson, 2016) . The GertlerKaradi type nancial accelerator introduces frictions between nancial intermediaries and households and allows the model to have the feedback between the nancial market and the economy. Generalized recursive preferences allows the model to match both macroeconomic and nancial stylized facts.
There are four types of agents in the model: households, nancial intermediaries, non-nancial 6 The model-implied equity premium is 0.23% with the liquidity constraint, while it is 0.224% without the friction. 
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rms, and capital producers. The latter are required to make the endogenous capital price tractable as suggested by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) . Figure 1 displays the building blocks of the model. In order to produce output, non-nancial rms purchase capital and hire labor from capital producers and households, respectively. Firms issue security claims, S t , to buy capital, K t+1 , and pay gross return of capital, R k t+1 , to nancial intermediaries. Households give funds to nancial intermediaries as deposits, D t , and receive a risk-free return, e r t+1 . Finally, the price of capital, Q t , is endogeneously determined by capital demand from non-nancial rms and supply from capital producers.
Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. Each household is endowed with generalized recursive preferences as in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) . For simplicity, the model in the present paper employs the additive separability assumption for period utility following Woodford (2003) . 
In this case, the stochastic discount factor is more complicated since consumption and leisure form a composite good.
On the other hand, the additive separability assumption facilitates a simpler stochastic discount factor which is aected by the growth of consumption only rather than the composite good.
where c t is household consumption, l t is labor in period t, and χ 0 > 0 and χ > 0 are parameters.
Moreoever, assuming logarithmic period utility for consumption allows a balanced growth path and unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution as in King and Rebelo (1999) . Households deposit to nancial intermediaries to earn the continuously-compounded default free interest rate, and provide labor to non-nancial rms to receive their wages. Using continuous compounding is convenient for equity pricing and comparison with the nance literature. Hence, the household's budget constraint is given by:
where d t is deposits, P t is the aggregate price level (to be dened later), w t is the real wage, e it is the nominal gross risk-free return from deposits, and Π t is the household's share of prots in the economy. 
where Γ is the choice set for c t and l t , Θ t is the state of the economy, β is the household's time discount factor, and α is a parameter. Risk aversion is closely related to the Epstein-Zin parameter α which amplies risk aversion by including the additional risk for the lifetime utility of households. 
which is similar to expected utility preferences except twisted and untwisted by the factor 1 − α. Note that the expected utility preferences are the special cases of generalized recursive preferences when α = 0, and the household's intertemporal elasticity of substitution is the same as that of the expected utility preferences case, but risk aversion can be amplied or attenuated by the additional curvature parameter α when α = 0. Although this form is convenient, an Epstein-Zin-Weil specication depends on the sign of period utility u (·). Therefore, Hansen and Sargent (2001) and Swanson (2016) consider multiplier preferences as they are free from the sign of period utility. Multiplier preferences can be obtained when ρ → 0 from the specication in Epstein and Zin (1989) :
for the case with period utility as (1) . This closed form expression considers both consumption and labor which provides additional cushion to the household against the negative shock.
.
The rst order necessary conditions for deposit and labor are given by:
Then, the one-period continuosly-compounded risk-free real interest rate, r t+1 , is
since e r t+1 ≡ e i t+1 1 π t+1 .
Financial Intermediaries
There is a unit continuum of bankers, and each risk neutral banker runs a nancial intermediary.
The nancial intermediaries lend funds to non-nancial rms by using their own net worth or issuing deposits to households. As suggested by Gertler and Karadi (2011), I introduce two key assumptions to ensure that there is always nancial friction between nancial intermediaries and households. First, nancial intermediaries have to borrow from households each period in the form of deposits. This assumption prevents the nancial intermediary from lending funds to non-nancial rms with their own capital alone. Thus, its balance sheet constraint is given by:
where Q t is the relative price of nancial claims on rms that the bank holds, s t is the quantity of each claim, and n t is the banker's net worth. The asset of the nancial intermediary, Q t s t , is composed of equity capital (or net worth), n t , and debt, d t+1 as in (8) . To keep the number of bankers stable 10 The household's optimization problem with generalized recursive preferences can be solved using the standard Lagrangian method. See Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) for more detail.
and to prevent the accumulation of net worth, there is an i.i.d. survival probability σ for the fraction who can remain in the nancial industry in the next period. So, (1 − σ) fraction of bankers retire and consume their net worth when they leave. Second, households are willing to deposit in nancial intermediaries. There is a moral hazard problem between depositors and nancial intermediaries: a nancial intermediary may divert a portion of its assets after deposits are collected. Consequently, the incentive constraint must hold in order to avoid households punishing diverting bankers by ceasing to supply deposits:
where ϑ is a fraction when the banker diverts the assets of the nancial intermediary, and V b t is the bank's franchise value (dened below). As long as the banker is constrained due to the nancial friction, the risk neutral banker's objective is to maximize its consumption at the exit period:
Observe that the nancial intermediary's terminal wealth, n t+j , is the banker's consumption, c b t+j , in the exit period.
11 (10) can be written in the rst-order recursive form:
The net worth of a surviving nancial intermediary in the next period, n t+1 , is simply the gross return of the asset net of the cost of debts:
where R k t+1 is the gross return of capital. Then, the growth rate of net worth is
11 The bankers discount net worth with β since they are risk neutral. The basic results of the model do not change even if the bankers use the stochastic discount factor of households as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) .
where φ t ≡
Qtst nt
is the leverage multiple. Note that the growth rate of net worth is increasing in the leverage multiple when the spread, R k t+1 − e r t+1 , is positive.
Since (8) and (11) are constant returns to scale, (11) is equivalent to
where µ t ≡ βE t Ω t+1 R k t+1 − e r t+1 is the excess marginal value of assets over deposits,
is the marginal cost of deposits, and
is the weighted average of the marginal values of net worth to exiting and to continuing bankers at t + 1.
Combining (9) and (14) yields the leverage multiple:
if incentive constraint binds and µ t ∈ (0, ϑ). Since the leverage multiple is a common factor as in (15), the aggregate leverage constraint is
where S t is the aggregate quantity of claims and N t is the aggregate net worth.
The aggregate net worth consists of two components. The rst is the net worth of surviving nancial intermediaries. With the survival probability, σ, the banker remains in the banking sector, in which case the banker earns the net revenue, R k t Q t−1 S t−1 − e rt D t . The second corresponds to seed money, ωQ t S t−1 , that a new banker receives in every period from their respective household. This seed money is a small fraction, ω, of the value of the exiting nancial intermediary's assets. Accordingly, the aggregate net worth of the entire banking sector is
where D t is the aggregate amount of deposits.
12 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) calls the franchise value per unit of net worth,
Lastly, aggregate consumption of exiting bankers is the fraction (1 − σ) of net earnings of assets:
where C b t = c b t denotes aggregate consumption demanded by bankers.
Firms

Non-Financial Firms
There is a single nal good which is produced using a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by f ∈ [0, 1] with the following production function:
where y t (f ) is an intermediate good, and θ > 0 is a parameter captures the equilibrium markup. The nal goods rms are perfectly competitive and maximize prots subject to the production function.
This implies a downward sloping demand curve for each intermediate good:
where P t is the CES aggregate price of the nal good:
which can be derived from the zero prot condition.
The economy contains a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods rms indexed by f ∈ [0, 1]. Firms purchase capital goods from capital producers and hire labor from households. They also issue claims, s t , to nancial intermediaries in order to obtain nancing. Firms have identical Cobb-Douglas production functions:
where k t (f ) and l t (f ) are rm f 's capital and labor inputs, and η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the rm's output elasticity with respect to labor. A t is a technology which follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
where ρ A ∈ (−1, 1], and A t follows an i.i.d. white noise process with mean zero and variance σ 2 A . I set ρ A = 1 for comparability to the asset pricing literature (e.g., Tallarini, 2000; and Swanson, 2016 ).
Subject to the demand function and the production function, the intermediate goods rm chooses labor, l t (f ), and capital, k t (f ). The rst order necessary conditions are:
where ϕ t (f ) is the Lagrange multiplier of the cost minimization problem, and δ denotes the depreciation rate of capital. Note that Q t P t (1−δ) in (25) is the value of the remained capital stock from the previous period. Combining these conditions yields the capital-labor ratio:
Since the capital-labor ratio is a common factor as in (26), it is the same to the aggregate ratio:
where K t is aggregate capital and L t is the aggregate quantity of labor. Moreoever, every rm hires capital and labor in the same way, so marginal cost is also the same across rms. Let mc t (f ) ≡ ϕt(f ) Pt be the real marginal cost. Then, mc t (f ) = M C t for all f since ϕ t (f ) is not an individual rm-specic factor either:
Each intermediate goods rm sets the new contract price p t (f ) to maximize the rm's lifetime prot according to Calvo contracts: only a fraction, 1 − ξ, can adjust its price each period. Hence, the value of the rm is given by:
where m t,t+j ≡ Π j i=1 m t+i is the stochastic discount factor of household from period t to t + j,π is steady-state ination rate, and mc n t (f ) is rm-specic nominal marginal cost.
The rst order necessary condition of (31) with respect to p t (f ) yields the standard New Keynesian price optimality condition:
Note that the optimal price p * t (f ) is a markup over a weighted average of current and expected future marginal costs.
Capital Producers
Lastly, there is a continuum of representative capital producers. They sell new capital to intermediate goods rms at price Q t , and produce it using the input from the nal output at price unity subject to convex (quadratic) investment adjustment cost.
13 The capital producer chooses new capital, I t , in order to maximize expected discounted prots over her lifetime:
13 While there are multiple ways to introduce the investment adjustment cost, this paper follows along the lines of
where κ denotes the elasticity of the investment adjusment costs. Observe that with zero investment adjustment costs, κ = 0, the rms would produce innite capital if Q t > 1. A large elasticity of the investment adjusment costs κ implies that the capital producer cannot change her supply easily.
The rst order necessary condition with respect to I t yields:
which is the supply of new capital.
Aggregate Resource Constraints and Monetary Policy
Combining the downward sloping demand curve and the production function yields the aggregate output:
where
θ df denotes the cross-sectional price dispersion.
A monetary authority in the model determines the one-period nominal interest rate, i t , by a simple
Taylor-type rule with interest-rate smoothing:
where ρ i ∈ (0, 1) is the smoothing parameter, r = log(1/β) is the continuously compounded real interest rate in steady state, π t ≡ log (P t /P t−1 ) is the ination rate,π is the target ination of the monetary authority, y t is the log of output Y t ,
is a trailing moving average of y t , and φ π , φ y ∈ R and ρȳ ∈ [0, 1) are parameters. As suggested by Swanson (2016) , the term (y t −ȳ t ) in (36) is an empirically motivated measure of the output gap. In practice, the central bank adjusts the short term nominal interest rate when the output deviates from its recent history. Since monetary policy also aects the real risk-free return according to the Fisher equation, setting the output gap with (37) helps to generate the risk premium consistent with the actual data.
Finally, the economy-wide resource constraint is given by:
where C t = c t denotes aggregate consumption of households.
The Equity Premium
Once I obtain the stochastic discount factor for the household, it is straightforward to calculate the equity price (Cochrane, 2009 ). I model stocks as a levered claim on the aggregate consumption for simplicity. This interpretation of dividends is standard in the asset pricing literature (e.g., Abel, 1999;  and Campbell, Pueger, and Viceira, 2014). In every period, the levered equity pays the consumption stream C υ t . Note that υ is the degree of leverage which captures a broad leverage in the economy, including operational and nancial leverage. Therefore, the price of an equity security in equilibrium is given by:
where p e t denotes the ex-dividend price of an equity at time t.
Let R e t+1 be the ex-post gross return on equity, R e t+1 ≡ 
which is the same form as the intertemporal Euler equation.
Let ψ e t denote the equity premium, ψ e t ≡ E t R e t+1 − e r t+1 . Using the denition of covariance, (40) is equivalent to
Intuitively, (42) shows why the equity is a very long-lived asset. Recall that the household's stochastic discount factor is comprised of the consumption and the value function, V h t , that is the innite sum of discounted future period utilities. The equity premium is thus sensitive to any changes in the consumption, even at a distant period. The model incorporates the nancial accelerator which has the amplication structure containing many state variables. Thus, computation time is also important because a third-order accurate solution may take considerable time to compute. Lastly, a third-order perturbation is necessary to capture the dynamic of the risk premia, such as the impulse-response analysis of the equity premium.
Quantitative Results
I calibrate the model rather than estimate the parameters since the main objective of this study is to illuminate the role of the nancial accelerator on asset pricing. As can be seen in Table 1 , the baseline calibration is fairly standard for both macroeconomics and nance variables. For the household's discount factor, β, the depreciation rate, δ, and the elasticity of output with respect to labor, η, I use conventional values. I also set the relative utility weight of labor, χ 0 = 0.79, to normalize the steady state labor, L = 1. I use relatively high risk aversion R c = 60 for simplicity and comparability to the asset pricing literature. This high value is common in the macro-nance literature, and is due to the small amount of uncertainty in the simple model. 
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As the top right panel illustrates, the response of marginal cost is attenuated in the model with the nancial accelerator. Since the price of capital is further reduced by the nancial accelerator, the production cost of intermediate goods rm is reduced. This can be found more formally from (28) . Negative technology shock increases marginal cost, but the capital price decreases more with nancial frictions, which moderately oset marginal cost increases. As a result, ination, which is the discounted weighted average of current and future marginal costs, also rises less in the model with the nancial accelerator. Although the mechanisms are dierent, the behavior of ination is similar to that of Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim, and Zakraj²ek (forthcoming). The authors nd through micro-level data that only intermediary goods rms that are bound by nancial constraints raise their prices in recession and explain why ination has remained low since the Great Recession.
Due to the nancial accelerator, ination is less increased and output is decreased further, so the 17 There are many other alternatives. For example, I draw random numbers for the technology shock A t from its distribution using a random number generator and use these values for the simulation. There is, however, no large dierence in the results between these two methods because agents in the model economy do not have perfect foresight. 18 In models without nancial frictions, the impulse response of the spread is not completely zero, because the gure is the third-order impulse response. On the other hand, in the rst-order impulse response, the spread always shows a zero response as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The gure plots third-order impulse response functions of the return of capital, R k t , price of capital, Q t , marginal cost, M C t , ination rate, π t , the net risk-free return, r t+1 , the spread, E t R k t+1 − e r t+1 , consumption, C t , investment, I t , and output, Y t , to a one-standard-deviation (0. central bank has incentive to lower the interest rates more. Thus, as can be seen from the middle center panel, the risk-free return is further reduced in the presence of nancial frictions. This can also aect the equity premium, which I will discuss in Section 3.3 in detail. Lastly, the similarity in impulse response functions for key macroeconomic variables in this model and these in the literature allow us to focus on implications for the equity premium. Table 2 reports the equity premium, ψ e t , implied by the model, solved to third order, holding other parameters of the model set at their benchmark values. For comparison purposes, I also provide the results from the model with various values of risk aversion, R c , and persistence of technology, ρ A .
Equity Premium Results
The equity premium increases monotonically with risk aversion and persistence of technology since they raise the volatility of the stochastic discount factor as in Swanson (2016) . The equity premium responds more sensitively to changes in technology persistence, because equity is long-lived asset and the equity premium is related with the household's value function as shown in (42) .
For the baseline model, the model-implied equity premium, ψ e t = 6.52, matches its empirical estimate (typically about 3 to 6.5 percent for quarterly excess returns at an annual rate).
19 Thus, the model with the nancial accelerator and generalized recursive preferences generates a suciently large equity premium. Table 2 also reports the results from the model without nancial frictions. As can be seen in the last column of Panel A and B, the nancial accelerator increases the equity premium in all cases. For instance, when the risk aversion is 60, the equity premium is increased about 46 basis points above the prediction of the model without the nancial accelerator.
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Why does the nancial accelerator increase the equity premium? It is because the nancial accelerator increases the volatility of the stochastic discount factor in the model. I compute unconditional standard deviations of the stochastic discount factors from two models using logarithmic deviation with a Hodric-Prescott detrending. The standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor is 64.72
percentage points in the presence of the nancial accelerator and 62.22 percentage points withoutnancial frictions. For the sake of argument, consider a negative technology shock. When the technology declines, the return of capital, R k t , decreases as the marginal productivity of capital contracts. The decrease in the return of capital lowers the aggregate net worth of the banks, N t , because the decline in return of capital reduces the marginal value of assets for intermediated nance. The reduction in net worth of the banks decreases their lending capacity, making the quantity of claims, S t , and capital, K t+1 , decrease. Then, the price of capital, Q t , falls as demand for capital decreases. In turn, the lower capital price further pushes down the return of capital, the net worth of the nancial intermediary, and the price of capital repeatedly. As a consequence, the amplication mechanism of the nancial accelerator increases the volatility of the stochastic discount factor.
I also provide a dynamic analysis for a more detailed examination. Figure 3 plots the impulse response functions to a one-standard-deviation (0.7 percent) negative technology shock, computed by 19 Of course, even with lower risk aversion values, the equity premium predicted by the model can be increased by incorporating other shocks, such as monetary policy shock or scal policy shock.
20 Even though the nancial accelerator increases the equity premium, it does not increase as much as GYZ who document that costly external nance increases the equity premium by a factor of 10 to 20. This is likely due to the model-implied equity premium in GYZ being very small (0.022 percent in the presence of nancial friction), so nancial frictions may seem to play a relatively large role. In contrast, in my model, generalized recursive preferences play a signicant role in generating the substantial equity premium. while it jumps about 62 percent for the frictionless model. This is consistent with the intuition that the nancial accelerator increases the volatility of the stochastic discount factor.
Since the equity premium is conditional covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the return of the equity as in (42), it is worth noting not only the dynamic of the stochastic discount factor but also the equity price. The center panel shows the impulse response function for the equity price, p e t . It immediately drops downward about 2.5 percent to the shock and gradually converges to its new nonstochastic steady state. For the frictionless model, the equity price drops less in response to the shock and shows a less volatile response. The reason of this can be found in the impulse response of consumption in Figure 2 . Because the dividend is a levered claim on consumption, the equity price is highly correlated with consumption. Therefore, the equity premium shows fourfold greater and much more persistent response when the model has the nancial accelerator as in the right-hand panel. Note: The gure plots third-order impulse response functions of the net risk-free return, r t , the equity price, p e t , and the equity premium, ψ e t , to a one-standard-deviation (0.7 percent) negative technology shock. The blue solid, the dashed orange, and dash-dot yellow lines report the impuls response functions from the baseline model when ρ i =0.8, 0.6, and 0, respectively. See text for details.
Smoothing Parameter of Monetary Policy
The nancial accelerator increases ination a little and amplies the decrease in output as in Section 3.1. This aects how the central bank sets the interest rate which has a signicant impact on the equity premium. For example, if the central bank responds more strongly to lowering the ination gap, the risk-free return goes up and, in turn, it reduces the equity premium. Thus, the size of the response of the equity premium varies depending on the stance of the central bank regarding output and ination. This section analyzes the impact on the equity premium by controlling the smoothing parameter, ρ i , rather than only the ination coecient or the output gap coecient separately.
Panel C in Table 2 reports the model-implied equity premiums calculated with various smoothing parameters. In the model with the nancial accelerator, the smaller the interest rate inertia, the less the equity premium. On the other hand, the model without nancial frictions increases the equity premium as interest rate inertia weakens. The equity premium generated by the model with the nancial accelerator is even smaller when the smoothing parameter is as small as 0.2.
Why do they
give opposite results? In the model without the friction, the risk-free rate increases as the interest rate inertia decreases. This reduces the ination gap, but it does not help overcome the recession.
Consumption therefore becomes more unstable, and this increases the equity return. Since the rise in the equity return is greater than the increase in the risk-free rate, the equity premium increases.
By contrast, in the presence of the nancial friction, the recession is more severe, and this limits the increase in the risk-free rate. Consumption and the equity price are relatively less volatile, so the equity return is not sensitive to changes in the smoothing parameter. As a consequence, the equity premium decreases as the risk-free rate increases.
For more detailed explanation, Figure 4 reports the impulse response functions for the risk-free return, the equity price, and the equity premium to 0.7 percent negative technology shock with dierent interest rate inertia values. The solid blue lines in each panel plot impulse response functions for a stronger smoothing parameter, the dashed orange lines plot the impulse response functions for weaker inertia, and the dash-dot yellow lines plot the impulse response functions for no interest rate smoothing.
The interest rate responds more to the ination gap as interest rate inertia gets smaller. This is because the coecient of the ination gap, φ π , is 1.53, while the coecient of the output gap, φ y , is about 0.23 per quarter, so the central bank is more concerned with the increased ination gap. However, in the presence of the nancial accelerator, because the recession is more severe, the risk-free return always responds negatively even if there is no inertia. The responsese of consumption and equity price are therefore not as volatile as in the frictionless model, and there is not much eect of interest rate smoothing on equity returns. So the response of the equity premium is moderately reduced as in the 21 The estimates for the interest rate inertia are between 0.6 and 0.8 (e.g., Rudebusch, 2002; Smets and Wouter, 2007;  and Del Negro, Giannoni, and Schorfheide, 2015) . So, 0.2 is an unrealistically small number, but I calculated it for thoroughness of the paper. For the same reason, I nd that both models produce 6.45 of the equity premum when the smoothing parameter is 0.35. Note: Model-based unconditional moments of the stochastic discount factor, σ(m t ), and the equity premium, ψ e t . σ(m C t ) denotes the standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor due to consumption growth, and σ(m V t ) denotes the additional standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor due to generalized recursive preferences. All numbers are in percentage points.
right panel at (a). On the other hand, the case is dierent in the nancial frictionless model. Since ination is relatively higher and output is less decreased, the central bank raises the interest rate, when there is no interest rate inertia as in the left panel at (b). In turn, the responses of consumption and the equity price are further reduced and more volatile. As a consequence, even if the risk-free return increases, the equity premium responds more positively as the equity return increases.
Investment Adjustment Costs
Jermann (1998) and GYZ astutely note that increasing the adjustment costs of capital improves the asset pricing performance by raising both the volatility of consumption and stock returns. Table 3 shows the model-implied equity premium for various investment adjustment costs. The equity premium is not very sensitive to κ, with or without the nancial accelerator. For example, in the frictionless model, the equity premium increases only 18 basis points, even if the investment adjustment cost is raised unrealistically to 30 from 3.
22 There are two key reasons why investment adjustment costs do not signicantly aect the equity premium in my model. First, households do not own capital. Since the models in this paper introduce capital producers to easily determine the capital price endogenously, the volatility of the capital price does not aect the consumption or the stochastic discount factor of households. Second, households do not have habit preferences. If the household owns capital, consumption smoothing can be aected greatly by habit, as in Jermann (1998) . At the same time, the equity premium decreases as the investment adjustment cost gets larger in the model with the nancial accelerator. For instance, the equity premium is reduced about 12 basis points by increasing the elasticity of investment adjustment costs to 30 from 3. As κ increases, the variability of capital decreases, which reduces the volatility of the bank's net worth. Accordingly, it is less costly to smooth consumption for the households although the impact is very small.
Finally, for a more detailed examination, I decompose the standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor into two parts. The rst is a marginal rate of substitution of consumption, so it is the same as the stochastic discount factor from the expected utility preferences. The second is the additional volatility of the stochastic discount factor due to generalized recursive preferences. The result tells us that the volatility of the stochastic discount factor varies due to the additional part, rather than from changes of consumption growth in two models. In the model with the nancial accelerator, the adjustment costs of investment have a small impact on the household's consumption smoothing; therefore, it does not change the equity premium substantially.
Conclusion
This paper examines the eect of the nancial accelerator on the equity premium with two modications to a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model: rst, the Gertler-Karadi type nancial accelerator which allows the model to have interaction between the nancial market and macroeconomy, and second, generalized recursive preferences to generate a substantial risk premium without compromising stylized macroeconomic facts. A quantitative analysis of the model shows that the nancial accelerator is a very plausible and new amplication mechanism for asset pricing in the model because it increases the volatility of the stochastic discount factor and lowers the risk-free return. The nancial accelerator increases the price of the risk in the model since it makes consumption more volatile. Moreover, the nancial accelerator generates more severe recessions but lower ination to a negative technology shock.
Due to the lower ination, the central bank has more incentive to lower the risk-free interest rate in a recession and this increases the equity premiumthe dierence between the expected return to equity and the risk-free rate.
In a nutshell, the model makes progress on the task of consolidating the analysis of asset prices and macroeconomics with nancial frictions. However, there is a lot of potential for improvement because the model has been simplied to understand the underlying mechanism of the nancial accelerator and its impact on the equity premium. In future research, it may be useful to extend the role of lenders to taking into account the collateral of the borrower. Because housing nance was particularly a big issue in the Great Recession, and household consumption was dampened due to the subprime mortgage crisis. Financial intermediaries in this paper however consider only corporate nance and household deposits. Extending the model to incorporate housing prices such as Iacoviello (2005) Final goods sector For the alternative model, there is no banking sector and the arbitrage condition E t (m t+1 e r t+1 ) = E t (m t+1 R k t+1 ) holds.
